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Abstract
The paper explains why institutions matter for a deep integra-
tion process, as illustrated by the liberalization of Non-Tari  Barriers
(NTBs) in Europe. We argue that deep trade liberalization requires
supranational institutions of deeper integration that permit enforce-
ment, surveillance, and adjudication. To support the claim, we develop
a simple model showing why mutual recognition of norms and testing
procedures, coupled with a supranational institution can shape the
equilibrium level of NTBs in every member state. Member states host
special-interest groups that make political contributions to inﬂuence
their respective government’s choice of NTBs. Politicians maximize
a realistic welfare function that favours contributions over consumer’s
social welfare. The supranational institution drains the incentive to
lobby for NTBs. The paper discusses the structure of protection that
emerges in the equilibrium, stressing how the lobbies’ contributions
vary with the e ectiveness of the supranational institution in reducing
NTBs in the ﬁnal policy outcome. We then use the model to explain
the liberalization of NTBs in the EU.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F13, F15
Keywords: economic integration, endogenous protection.
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There is deep versus shallow integration in the world, the European Union
(EU) is a deep one. The EU is the biggest peaceful e ort ever made to
bring the peoples of the continent together. It is an exceptional endeav-
our without parallel elsewhere. Since the collapse of the European Defense
Community in 1954, most of the e ort has focused on economic integra-
tion. One of the most unusual aspects of European economic integration is
deep trade liberalization; or the removal of technical barriers to trade arising
from heterogeneous national norms (technical regulations and standards),
and testing procedures.1 The European process of NTB liberalization has no
equivalent anywhere else in the world.2
Unlike any other trade arrangement, the ECJ has legislative authority,
which supersedes national legislation. In the European experience the issue
of supranationality has played a key role to foster deep trade liberalization.
None questions the role of the European institutions to liberalize internal
trade. Liberalization of tari s and quotas is relatively simple. The GATT
and its successor, the WTO, have been extraordinary successful in the mul-
tilateral context, and the EU, and NAFTA in the regional one. In all these
cases negotiation has produced the desired outcome.
Deep trade liberalization is tricky. NTBs restrain trade by raising for-
eign ﬁrms’ costs relative to the domestic ones. As Baldwin (2000) suggests,
liberalization requires lowering the wedge. There are two dimensions to it;
content-of-norms, and testing procedures. Liberalization of the ﬁrst involves
making product norms more cosmopolitan and thus narrowing the cost ad-
vantage of domestic ﬁrms. Liberalization of the second involves lowering
the excess costs that foreign ﬁrms face in demonstrating compliance of their
goods to accepted norms. There are two ways forward along both dimen-
sions, harmonization (convergence to a single norm or test), and mutual
recognition (acceptance of foreign norms and tests). Harmonization can be
accomplished through negotiation (a discussion aimed at agreeing a single
norm), or through the hegemonic route, (everyone adopts the norms of a
1Technical regulations are mandatory whereas standards are voluntary. Norms are the
speciﬁc requirements that products have to meet to be sold in a particular market; testing
is required to assess whether products conform with the norms.
2Australia, and New Zealand have made some progress towards NTB liberalization but
it is still very incipient.
1hegemonic state).
There are few recent examples of deep trade liberalization.3 The Eu-
ropean experience is the most signiﬁcant one. The EU has been dealing
with NTBs since the Treaty of Rome. In 1957 the Community advocated
for harmonization of technical standards but it did not happen; in fact it
went backwards. Then from 1969 to 1983 the Community worked on a
Programme that far from eliminating NTBs witnessed an increase in tech-
nical barriers in the internal market. And then the ECJ enforced mutual
recognition and NTB liberalization followed very quickly.
European institutions have been important, and most researchers claim
that mutual recognition is also an important aspect of NTB liberalization.4
But, how does the combination of a supranational institution of deeper
integration, and mutual recognition lead to liberalization? We present a
model that provides a plausible explanation for the question. The model is
motivated by the EU experience but it is more general than that; we use it to
investigate the role of institutions in liberalization. We develop a model in
which the combination of mutual recognition, and the court as an imperfect
enforcement and surveillance mechanism, change the equilibrium in a way
that there is no lobbying in the ﬁrst place. There is a quick change, and
NTBs disappear because nobody wants them anymore.
We organized the paper as follows: section 2 develops a simple formal
model of supranational institutions in deep trade liberalization. We show
how a supranational institution, and mutual recognition of norms and testing
procedures can eliminate NTBs. We discuss some welfare implications, and
the fact that there are winers and losers, but the winers win more. In
section 3 we ﬁrst use the model to inform a discussion over “stage zero”.
And then we use the model to explain the liberalization of NTBs in the EU.
We conclude in section 4 summarizing the main ﬁndings and providing some
avenues for future research.
This is as far as the discussion can go without a formal model. We are
turning now to a political economy model that crystallizes the logic behind
institutions of deep integration, and NTB liberalization.
3The process of formation of nations are old examples.
4See Egan (2001) for a detailed account.
22 Institutions and Deep Integration: A Formal
Model
In order to make the analysis of NTB liberalization tractable, we consider
the following simple model.
Consider a union of small and symmetric states, and a supranational
court of justice. Without loss of generality we will refer to them as the Euro-
pean Union (EU), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Member states
are free to adopt norms, and testing procedures that may generate NTBs
in their territory. Individuals, industries, and member states, however, can
complain about them before the ECJ. The court applies the principle of
mutual recognition of norms, and testing procedures when it ﬁnds that the
regulation presents an unnecessary distortion of trade. Supranational law
supersedes state’s law.
We are going to take the perspective that NTBs are politically optimal.
This perspective has been the subject of formal work by Grossman and
Helpman (1994). It may be useful to present it informally, we assume that
governments make their trade policy choices in response to industry lob-
bying pressures balanced against consumer interests. This is known as the
lobbying approach to endogenous protection, and it assumes that all elected
governments respond to lobbying activities in the same way. We model the
lobbying activities as a menu auction problem.5 Namely, a situation where
the lobby announces a menu of contributions for various possible NTBs open
to an auctioneer and then pay the bids according to the action selected.
On the supply side, we consider a factor-speciﬁc framework.6 This elimi-
nates general equilibrium supply-side e ects because wages are pinned down
by productivity in the numeraire industry and each industry-speciﬁc factor
is paid the Ricardian rent. A typical individual derives income from wages
wL, and from the industry-speciﬁc factor that he may own. In particular,
owners of the speciﬁc input used by industry i see their income tied to the
domestic price of i. All income is expended.
Each member state is inhabited by individuals with identical preferences
but di erent indutry-speciﬁc factor endowments. The consumption space is
bounded, good 0 acts as a numeraire and there are n non-numeraire goods.
5See Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a more
more detailed treatment.
6Ricardo-Viner setup.
3Every industry produces one type of good. The numeraire good is produced
from labour alone. The non-numeraire goods are produced from labour
and an industry-speciﬁc factor. In order to eliminate cross-price e ects on
the demand side, we assume that preferences are separable industry-by-
industry. Preferences are strictly convex, and quasi-linear with respect to
the numeraire good. We normalize the world and domestic price of the nu-
meraire good to 1. Individuals derive utility from the consumption of goods.
Given these assumptions we can represent the individual’s preferences by the
following quasi-linear utility function:




where c0 is the consumption of the numeraire good; ci is the consumption
of the good produced by industry i; i = 1,2,...,n and n is the number of
non-numeraire industries. The sub-utility functions of the non-numeraire
industries ui[ci] are increasing, di erentiable, and strictly concave.
We denote by pw
i the exogenous world price7 of the good produced by
industry i, while pi represents its domestic price. NTBs are the only trade
barrier in this world. NTBs drive a wedge  i between domestic and foreign
price of the good produced by industry i. Thus, we denote domestic prices
by pi = (pw
i +  i). Liberalization consists in reducing the wedge.
Utility-maximizing individuals consume x0 = E  
 
i=1 pidi(pi), and
xi = di(pi); where E is the budget constraint (E stands for expenditure).
The individual’s optimal choice is embodied in the Walrasian demand func-
tion (note that di(·) the inverse of u 
i[ci]). Given the assumption of quasi-
linear preferences the demand is independent of income. The individual’s
optimal utility value is captured by the following indirect utility function:




where Si [pi] is the industry-speciﬁc consumer surplus function.
In some exogenous set of industries, industry-speciﬁc factor owners are
organized politically.8 Organized industries push for NTBs in order to un-
7Thanks to the small nation assumption we do not have to worry about it. The small
country assumption is convenient so the volume of purchases and sales of each member
state does not a ect its “border prices”.
8See Olson (1971).
4dermine foreign competitors and thus create rents for themselves. As a
result, each member state hosts special-interest groups that make political
contributions to inﬂuence the incumbent government’s choice of NTBs. The
remaining industries and consumers are not organized, and therefore do not
o er any political contribution to the government. We assume that in each
member state, all ﬁrms in an industry act as one when it comes to political
contributions.
Contributions are directly and intuitively related to the main reason for
lobbying: raising the price of goods that the industry sells by increasing
the costs faced by foreign competitors. We can use reasoning from contract
theory to argue that it is natural to expect each lobby’s contribution to
be truthful in the sense that each lobby’s contribution varies with NTBs in
the same way that the lobby’s objective function varies with NTBs. The
contribution schedules are as follows:
Ci[pi] =  i[pi] +  iN (Si[pi] + L)   Bi (3)
where  i[pi] is the total the “Ricardian” surplus earned by ﬁrms in industry
i; N is the number of individuals in a member state;   is the fraction of
the population that owns the industry-speciﬁc factor for industry i; and L
is the individual’s labour endowment. Contributions may be reduced by a
constant Bi. Without loss of generality we are going to assume that   is
zero.9
The present framework is, essentially, applied contract theory. In con-
tract theory, we use two expressions to characterize the optimal contract:
the incentive constraint (the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition taking the con-
tract as given), and the participation constraint (the requirement that the
expected reward is generous enough to induce the agent to accept the con-
tract in the ﬁrst place). The lobby presents the government with incentive
contracts called contribution schedules that induce the government to do
what the organized industry wants the government to do. The government
is the agent and the lobby is the principal.
Note that the form of the contribution schedule is exactly equal to the
lobby’s welfare minus Bi. This means that the lobby’s contributions are di-
9As Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2006) argue, we are confronted to an awkward situ-
ation where the lobby also adjusts its contributions to his interest as consumer. This is
what they call the “ice-cream clause.”
5rectly related to its rents,  i[pi], but a lobby is not required to contribute all
its Ricardian rents to the government; the lobby can reduce its contributions
by Bi to retain some of the fruits of lobbying without violating the truth-
fulness constraint. All they have to do is to make sure that the government
goes along with it.10 The lobby does not necessarily give any money, when
the point to make is that contribution won’t have any e ect it can set Bi in
a way that does not have to pay anything to the government.11
The national government values the total amount of political contri-
butions and social welfare. Speciﬁcally, the government favours campaign
contributions over the individual’s well being because the former provides
a higher probability of becoming re-elected. The government of the typical
member state maximizes a realistic welfare function12 where organized pro-
ducers receive a higher relative weight than consumers, and non-organized
producers. The government’s objective function consists of a weighted sum
of the standard utilitarian social welfare W, and lobbying contributions
Ci[pi], that is:




where   is the set of industries that are politically organized, and as such are
able to make political contributions;13 a is how much the government weights
the consumer surplus, and the producer surplus in unorganized industries;
it can be interpreted as the relative weight that the government assigns to
the “general interest.” The parameter a is greater or equal to 0.
An equilibrium in the model is a set of contribution schedules, one for
each industry, such that each one maximizes the joint welfare of the lobby
given the anticipated political optimization by the government; and a domes-
tic price vector that maximizes the government’s objective function taking
the contribution schedules as given.
We have developed a quasi-general equilibrium model that relates the
level of NTBs in each state to its domestic political process. We are now
10Note that it is very di erent from assuming that lobbyists bribe the governments.
11It is right in the equilibrium. I give you an incentive to do something in the margin,
and then I take away to the point where you are just indi erent between saying yes or no
to the whole package. Basic contract theory.
12See Baldwin (1987) on realistic welfare functions.
13There is no restriction on the size of the parameter a.
6turning to discuss the equilibrium level of NTBs that will arise both in the
absence and in the presence of the ECJ.
2.1 The equilibrium level of NTBs
We are interested in ﬁnding the equilibrium level of pre-liberalization bar-
riers. Namely, the level of NTBs in the absence of the ECJ, and before the
principle of mutual recognition plays any role in the story.
The government’s decision problem is to ﬁnd the domestic vector of
prices that maximizes its objective function taking the contribution sched-
ules as given. Thus, the government’s problem is to choose  i in order to
maximize:




i   
 i[pi]
 
  + (1 + a)
 
i  
 i[pi]   Bi (5)
Given that 5 is continuously di erentiable, we can characterize an opti-
mal    by means of the ﬁrst-order conditions:
   = a
 
NS 
i[pi] +   
i [pi]
 
+   
i [pi] = 0 (6)
For tractability we assume linear demand and supply functions of the
type Qs[pi] = bspi, and Qd[pi] = ad  bdpi. We have that the change in con-
sumer surplus NS 
i[pi] is (minus) the level of consumption, and the change in
producer surplus   
i[pi] is the level of production. Therefore the parameter
a is multiplying the negative term M[pi], the level of imports.
We can rewrite 6 as follows:
a(M[pi]) =   
i(pi) (7)
The left hand side term in 7 can be thought of as the Marginal Economic
Cost (MEC) for the government of allowing NTBs. The right hand side can
be interpreted as the Marginal Political Beneﬁt (MPB) for the government
of adopting the NTB. Note that the MPB is identical to the domestic supply
curve Qs[pi].
Substituting the functional forms in 7 and solving for   
i we ﬁnd the level




[a(bd + bs) + bs]
  pw
i (8)
7where    is the equilibrium wedge (mark-up) on the domestic price of good
i;14 the impact on prices resulting from the government’s domestic choice
of equilibrium NTBs in industry i. Given the symmetry of the model, we





Figure 1: The level of NTBs    in the absence of the ECJ.
Figure 1 shows the MEC and MPB curves. The MPB curve is upward
sloped. The MEC curve could start from zero under some regulatory con-
ditions. Since the marginal economic loss from rising the NTB from zero is
zero it makes sense to plot it in such a way. The MEC rises as long as the
slopes of the domestic supply and demand curve do not change too much.
Given the assumption of linear supply and demand curves the MEC curve
is a positively sloped linear curve.
The determination of the level of contributions, in particular, the deter-
mination of the Bi’s is straight forward.15 In the model, the assumption of
truthfulness dictates the form of the contract, so 6 is the incentive constraint.
To ﬁnd the participation constraint, we assume that the government
has the right to refuse the contribution schedules. The assumption implies
that the lobby must ensure that the level of the government’s payo  is at
least as high when it accepts the contributions as when it does not. If the
government refuses the contribution schedule from the lobby in industry i,
14The calculation of the domestic price is straight forward; pi =
aad
[a(bd+bs)+bs].
15A similar procedure for determining the B’s is laid out in detail in Grossman and
Helpman (1994).
8its optimal choice of NTB is zero.16 Consequently, the lobby must ensure
that Bi is such that the government’s payo  is equal to its reservation payo ,
namely a times social welfare under free trade.17 An organized industry will
always choose to o er the contract to its agent, the government.
2.2 The equilibrium level of NTBs with the ECJ.
We are now going to determine the level of NTBs that arises in the pres-
ence of the ECJ, and the principle of mutual recognition in the model. The
combination of mutual recognition and the ECJ makes protection less at-
tainable to all ﬁrms, and changes the domestic problem in a way that favours
liberalization.
We can think of mutual recognition as “an agreement to disagree.” It
boils down to accepting that di erent regulations are simply di erent means
of achieving the same regulatory goals.18 The consequence for ﬁrms is free-
dom to use any of the available regulations, including those of their own
national state. Put simply, mutual recognition allows all ﬁrms to avoid
unpleasant foreign regulations that have the purpose of making their ex-
ports less competitive; products meeting the norms of any member state
enjoy single-market access. By the same token, ﬁrms realize that pushing
for similar unpleasant regulations at home does not protect them from for-
eign competition any longer. As a result, ﬁrms stop lobbying for regulatory
protectionism, namely NTBs. The result for governments is that lobbies
become less interested in regulatory protection.
The ECJ allows those hurt by NTBs to challenge them on court. We can
use economic reasoning to infer that the challenged NTBs are going to be
the ones creating the highest rents for the organized domestic ﬁrms, namely
those that create the greatest losses for foreign competitors. The ECJ acts
as an imperfect enforcement mechanism of mutual recognition. When the
ECJ backs the claim mutual recognition is the baseline principle. Mutual
recognition, and in particular its imperfect enforcement produced by the
Court, drains the lobbies’ incentive to lobby.
In the context of the model, we expect the lobby’s truthful contribution
schedule to capture the possibility to reach mutual recognition. The new
16Given the small nation ﬁction.









 i   Bi If the constraint binds;
 i[pi]   Bi Otherwise.
(9)
where C 
i is the level of contribution schedules. Note that at the margin the
lobby’s contribution is   
i(pi) up to the point where the constraint binds,
thereafter the marginal contribution drops to zero and stays there. We can
interpret the level of   as the maximum amount of the lobby’s producer
surplus that is not likely to be challenged in court.
The government (acting as an auctioneer) observes the “menu” of polit-
ical contributions that the lobby makes available, and aims to do as good
as it can. The government’s attainable rents are capped because mutual
recognition has taken away much of the incentive to lobby, and the lobbies
adjust their contribution schedules accordingly.
The salient feature of the model is the subtle intervention –or lack of it–
of the ECJ. The ECJ does not determine directly the size of  , those hurt
by NTBs do. In other words, surveillance is done by those hurt by NTBs.
The ECJ adjudicates in case of complain, and by taking a narrow view as to
what constitutes a NTB the ECJ can e ectively enforce a “tight  .” We can
think of it as a threshold.19 The ECJ introduces a constraint on the amount
of favour that lobbyists can extract from their national governments.
The presence of the court modiﬁes the government’s decision problem,
and the optimal choice of NTB. The government, as the agent, can only
choose among the contribution schedules proposed by the lobbies, and the
lobbies contribution schedules reﬂect the bound imposed by mutual recog-
nition. The government now faces a constraint on the MPB (the amount of
truthful contributions schedules). We can write the constraint as follows:
 i[pi]     (10)
The problem of the government now consists in choosing  i to maximize
its objective function 5 given constraint on the lobby’s rents.
So far so good, however, the ECJ and the possibility of mutual recog-
nition introduces some elements of complexity in the model. Note that the
constraint is continuous in the level space, but piecewise continuous in the
19In reality we could think of it as a diminimis rule; norms having a marginal impact
on trade are allowed.
10marginal space.20 This translates into the government’s objective function
having a kink at the point where the constraint becomes binding. As shown
in ﬁgure 2, the ﬁrst derivative of the producer surplus is positive until it
drops to zero when the constraint binds. The objective function is piecewise







Figure 2: The level of NTBs    in the presence of the ECJ.
There is a branch of mathematics that deals with non-smooth optimiza-
tion.21 We could apply it to solve this problem but it would require adding
some structure on the problem and some restrictive assumptions. We can
characterize a solution for the model in an accessible way, however, by re-
alizing that given the way the problem is deﬁned, the optima must be the
corner solution.
The solution method that we propose does not ﬁt the cookbook ap-
proach for constrained optimization; nevertheless it allows to characterize
the optimal level of NTBs    chosen by the government.
We propose to divide the problem in two parts. The ﬁrst part con-
sists in maximizing 5 up to the point where the constraint becomes binding
(included). The second part consists in maximizing 5 after the constraint
becomes binding.22 We then compare the local optima from each of the
parts, and choose the highest. We show that there is no point belonging to
20When the constraint becomes binding the marginal  i [pi] drops to zero.
21See Clarke (1983) for an introduction to the optimization of non-smooth functions.
22What the government wants to do is to get the marginal di erences as close as possible,
in fact zero if they can. The ﬁrst-order conditions say that we should equate the MEC
11the other part that yields a higher level of welfare for the government.
In the ﬁrst part, until the constraint becomes binding, Kuhn-Tucker
(necessary) conditions characterize the “local” optimum.23
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 i[pi]
 
  + (1 + a)
 
i  
 i[pi]   Bi +  (     i[pi]) (11)
By inspection of the Kuhn-Tucker (necessary) conditions:
 L
    = a
 
NS 
i[pi] +   
i[pi]
 




= (     i[pi])   0 (12)
With complementary slackness.24 Given the linear speciﬁcation of the
model we can ﬁnd an expression for the producer surplus that allows us
to solve the problem.25 The MEC of the government is the same as in
the absence of the court. The MPB is discontinuous and the discontinuity




bs   pw
i .
As for the second part, we have to show that there is no other point
where the government can do better. By inspection of the discontinuous
ﬁrst order conditions it is straight forward.
We can verify this because after the constraint becomes binding, the
change in the producer surplus   
i [pi] drops to zero. So we know that the
function must necessarily take a lower value.
We are able to characterize the solution because it is a corner situation.
The outcome is where the constraint is. The NTB will be dictated where
proﬁt is equal to  , and the solution is the   where the jump started if it
is binding. If it is not binding it is the same old one. And this is exactly
and the MPB, but if cannot equate them because of the non-di erentiability, should be
as close as possibe.
23Concerning the FOCs. The solution is obtained from the FOC on lambda. The ﬁrst
order condition is a necessary condition for a smooth function, and that’s why we do not
use it.
24The complementary slackness condition sates that  
 L
   = 0; with
 L
   = 0 where the
constraint binds.
25The expression for the producer surplus is  i[pi] =
bsp2
i











12what we want because what we get is that    is dictated by the institutional
constraint and if the constraint gets tighter, the   gets lower.
We denote by   
i the equilibrium level of NTBs in industry i; namely:






What we can see from 13 is that by choosing   the ECJ can bring the do-
mestic price anywhere between the free trade level and the pre-liberalization




The result allows us to characterize a range for   that yields any value
between the free trade outcome, and the equilibrium with the court. The




2 <   <
bs(aad)2
2[a(bs + bd) + bs]
2 (14)
In the presence of the ECJ the solution is the incentive constraint.
Namely, when the lobby does its best given the constraint that it faces.
There is no incentive constraint as before due to the non-smoothness prob-
lem. The incentive constraint is non-smooth. So that is the incentive con-
straint, their behaviour is compatible with what is good for them given the
contract that they observe.
The participation constraint in the presence of the ECJ is Bi. We can
verify that once the ﬁrms are done paying o  the government, there is some-
thing left over for them; that’s fairly obvious in this case. Bi is the di erence
between the government welfare with the ECJ and under free trade.26
2.3 Welfare considerations
In the model there is a di erence between the government’s objective func-
tion and the social welfare function. The problem arises when we deal with
institutions in economic models, and can be solved assuming a “veil of igno-
rance” type of evaluation; we are outside of the political system and evaluate
whether the ECJ is a good idea.27 We can also think of it as the right and














2+bs2 , which is positive for any
value of   > 1/2
ad




27Another way to think about this is like a constitution writing exercise; we write a
constitution under the “veil of ignorance.” The government, the consumers, etc. ignore
13left sides of the government’s brain; the government worries about social
welfare in stage one, but in stage two it cannot resist the lobbiests.28
The social welfare is simply the sum of the consumer and producer sur-
plus. Given the linear speciﬁcation of the model the expression for social
welfare in industry i is: SWi = adpi+
p2
i
2 (bs bd). We use the model to show
how the social welfare changes with mutual recognition and the court.
We denote by WFT the social welfare under free trade. Given the absence
of transport costs in the model the domestic price of the good produced by
industry i and its world price are identical. We have that pw
i = pi =
ad
(bs+bd);
and the corresponding level of social welfare is:
WFT = 1/2
ad
3a(aadbs + 2bs + 2bd   bdaad)
(bs + bd)
2 (15)
We denote by W  the social welfare in the absence of the ECJ; the level
of pre-liberalization social welfare. The domestic price of the good produced
in industry i is pi =
aad
[a(bs+bd)+bs]; and the associated level of social welfare
is:
W  = 1/4
aad
2  





We denote by W  the social welfare when the ECJ constrains the level of
attainable protection. The corresponding price is determined by  , namely




the associated level of welfare is:










Note that W  is positive for any value of   > 2
ad
2bs
( bs+bd)2. We verify
that as long as the domestic price with the court and mutual recognition
is below the pre-liberalization level, social welfare is higher with the court
than without:
(W  > W )    (p 
i < p 
i) (18)
the way it is going to be, we decide a system to lead best, and then we ﬁnd out whether
we do good or not given the system we have.
28See Bhagwati and Feenstra (1982) for a “left versus right brain” discussion in the
context of tari -setting.
14Given the linearity of the model individuals are better o  in the equilib-
rium in the presence of the ECJ. They face a lower price, and the consumer
surplus is higher. Organized industries are worse o  with the Court than
without since the price is lower and their combined producer surplus is also
lower than the pre-liberalization level. The court has no impact for non-
organized industries, if anything they win as consumers. Those who win
with the court win more than those who lose because the combined social
welfare is higher. Nobody would object to the ECJ.
3 Discussion
In this section, we ﬁrst step outside the model and use the model to inform
a discussion on “stage zero.” Then we use the model to explain a particular
episode of European integration: the liberalization of NTBs in the EU.
3.1 Some informal considerations
We refer to stage zero as the period of time when the deep measure is agreed;
it is the setting up phase. Although it is not formally addressed in the model
we can use the model to inform a discussion about it. Speciﬁcally, we can
use the results of the model to discuss whether or not the deep measure (a
supranational institution) would be acceptable.
When the deep measure is approved the wins exam is done under a veil
of ignorance; nobody knows who is going to be the lobby in the future. If
countries were to adopt a deep measure with immediate e ects, we would
expect a whole set of industries to lobby against it. But in the European
case what happened is that the deep measure was adopted in 1957 and it
does not really have an impact until thirty 30 years later. It was di cult
to know at that point who would win or lose. Moreover, since the society
as a whole is better o  with the court, it is reasonable not to expect major
objections to the court.
There may also be some aspects of discounting as well. Namely, potential
lobbyists discount heavily uncertain losses that are far in the future, as a
result the lobbies do not have any quasi-rents to defend. They do not get
organized during stage zero.
In reality the ones who actually have to agree are the governments that
negotiate the Treaty, and the people that have to approve it by referendum.
15Big institutional changes as a deep measure of integration very often involve
referendums where the citizens have to “more or less” approve it. It is
the way it works in democracy. In the model both the people and the
governments are happy with the Court, they are not shooting themselves in
the foot, or acting irrationally. As a result we can argue that it is natural
for the deep measure to be approved.
Organized industries lose from liberalization in their industries, but they
win from liberalization in the remaining industries. In an utilitarian frame-
work where one dollar counts one dollar, they do lose, there are winers and
losers but the winers win more, so as long as there is symmetry in the model
there is no reason for them not to agree to the ECJ. Everyone is involved in
referendums involving big institutional changes, rather than just the lobbi-
ests.
3.2 European institutions and internal trade liberalization
As pointed out in the introduction, the model is motivated by the European
experience with NTB liberalization. This section discusses the European
experience in the light of the economic and political economy logic that is
crystallized in our simple model.
The EU has been trying to deal e ectively with NTBs since the Treaty of
Rome. In 1957 the EEC advocated for harmonization of technical standards
but it did not happen, although internal tari s and quotas disappeared
very quickly. Little progress was made to eliminate NTBs but since 1968
essentially all intra-Community trade has been free from tari s and quotas;
subsequent liberalization has focused on NTBs.
Then from 1969 to 1983 the EEC worked on a General Programme that
speciﬁcally targeted NTBs.29 The Programme is known as the Old Ap-
proach and it deﬁned an ambitious agenda to eliminate all NTBs by 1971,
and to prevent new ones from being adopted. The Old Approach focused
on NTB liberalization through “negotiated harmonization.” Far from elim-
inating NTBs, it witnessed a surge of NTBs in the internal market. It was
a remarkable failure by any measure.30
In the 1970s, the ECJ ruled that most NTBs conﬂicted with the Treaty
29The General Programme for the removal of technical obstacles to trade was adopted
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Figure 3: The equilibrium level of NTBs in the presence and in the
absence of the ECJ.
of Rome and were therefore illegal. The rulings provided the key elements
for mutual recognition and are the basis of the New Approach. After the
Dassonville31 and Cassis32 sentences national governments were still free
to adopt di erent norms and testing procedures, but mutual recognition
assured that no signiﬁcant protection of the domestic market was to be
derived from them. Most NTBs could then be challenged in court under EU
law.33 The ECJ took a very narrow view as to what constituted an NTB; the
ones creating the highest rents (the greatest losses for foreign competitors)
were the ﬁrst ones to be challenged.
As we can observe in ﬁgure 3, the model provides a plausible explanation
for the process of European deep trade liberalization. The level of NTBs
in the presence of mutual recognition and the ECJ is unambiguously lower
than in the absence of the court; it is so because the ECJ can “dictate” a
level of   such that    <   .
The ECJ’s sentences fostered NTB liberalization in the EU because they
enforced the principle of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition guaranteed
that the goods legally produced in any member state enjoyed EU-market
access. As a result, the ECJ changed the value of lobbying for regulatory
protection, and the domestic political process inside each member state.
31In 1974 the ECJ ruled that “all trading rules enacted by member sates which are
capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade
are to be considered as measures having an equivalent e ect to quantitative restrictions.”
32In 1979 the ECJ explicitly allowed for some trade-inhibiting national norms, although
it set the permissibility very high for rules applying to “import-only.”
33Under EU law it is possible for citizens and ﬁrms to bring cases before the ECJ even
against its own government.
17In the context of our highly stylized model; mutual recognition drains the
incentive to lobby for NTBs. The maximum beneﬁt that a lobby can obtain
depends on whether mutual recognition is reached. The lobby takes the
foreign norm as given, and the ECJ implies that the maximum beneﬁt that
can be obtained is capped since any complain before the ECJ is likely to
lead to mutual recognition.
The sentences were an e ective transfer of sovereignty from the mem-
ber states to the European institutions. It meant that mutual recognition
was the baseline principle and the ECJ was going to drive the liberaliza-
tion agenda. We could wonder how the ECJ got so far out in front of EU
politician. The ECJ’s sentences ampliﬁed by the Commission’s embrace of
mutual recognition could have fostered regulatory competition, or even a
race to the bottom. But the rapid embrace of the New Approach by the EU
member states, ﬁrst, and the Single European Act (SEA) later, were the
means of regaining control over the liberalization process.
Of course, there were many other factors intervening. But the role of
theory is to crystallize the logic of an economic process in a simpliﬁed way.
What is relevant in the story is that the ECJ brought mutual recognition,
and mutual recognition did away with NTBs because it changed the domestic
political process in each member state. The supranational authority of the
ECJ is key to the liberalization of NTBs. The model shows that European
governments did not act irrationally when they agreed on the deep measure
that created the ECJ in 1957.
4 Concluding remarks
We argue that deep trade liberalization requires supranational institutions
that permit enforcement, surveillance, and adjudication. The paper presents
a simple model of how mutual recognition of norms and testing procedures,
and a supranational institution helps a group of protectionist states overcome
a coordination failure, and thus foster deep trade liberalization that can
beneﬁt them all.
The basic logic is very simple. Member states agree to a deep measure
that changes the incentives of national special interest groups to lobby for
NTBs in a way that leads quickly to a new equilibrium with lower barriers;
interestingly, all the parties involved in protection-making –the society as a
18whole, the government, and even organized ﬁrms– are acting rationally.
The model takes the perspective that NTBs are the result of the domestic
political process in each member state. Governments make their choice of
NTBs in response to industry lobbying activities balanced against consumer
interests. Mutual recognition is detrimental to the beneﬁts of lobbying, and
the supranational institution produces an imperfect enforcement of mutual
recognition.
Since NTBs are endogenous to the lobbying activities and lobbying is
a ected by mutual recognition, a supranational institution that enforces
mutual recognition changes the incentives to lobby for protection. In fact,
when mutual recognition is reached the beneﬁts of lobbying for NTBs evapo-
rate and the lobbies cease their activities. The model explains how barriers
which are politically optimal before the court are not politically optimal
afterwards; as a result some of the barriers disappear.
We show that the model provides a reasonable accounting of the liberal-
ization of NTBs in the EU; it is not empirical evidence but it is an example
in which the model helps to organize the thinking about what happened in
reality. What happened is that the EU failed to liberalize NTBs until the
ECJ enforced mutual recognition. From there onwards mutual recognition
would have been the baseline principle but politicians were quick to react
and the Council o cially launched the Single European Act on 1985. The
SEA increased the governments’ control over the liberalization process given
that the ECJ had established mutual recognition as the baseline principle.
In democracy the ones that have to approve to a “deep measure of in-
tegration” are the governments that negotiate the Treaty, and the citizens.
Since the entire society is involved in big institutional changes it makes sense
to think of a referendum rather than just the lobbyists. We have presented
a model where both the citizens and the governments are happy with the
Court, they are not acting irrationally by approving the ECJ. Of course
the lobbies that enjoyed high barriers before the Court do lose with it. In
an utilitarian framework where one dollar counts one dollar, they do lose,
there are winers and losers but the winers win more, so as long as there is
symmetry there is no reason for not to approve the deep measure.
We have not formalized strategic behaviours; namely why countries do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant opposition from the lobbies that would potentially lose
with the ECJ-type of agreements. We have assumed that lobbyists act under
19a veil of ignorance. At the time when the deep measure is taken nobody
knows who are going to be the lobbies in the future. An example from
the European experience may help to clarify the point. In 1957, when the
Treaty of Rome was signed none knew who would have an incentive to lobby
against it ﬁfty years later.
Given that the signature of the deep measure and liberalization happen
at very distant points in time there may be also some issues of discounting
potential future losses. When the treaty was signed the potential lobbies
did not have any quasi-rents to defend.
The European experience with NTBs raises some important questions
regarding the role of institutions in liberalization. Speciﬁcally, does deep
trade liberalization in the multilateral context also require supranational in-
stitutions? or could mutual recognition work under a lighter enforcement
mechanism than the ECJ? In future research it would also be interesting
to step outside the EU and investigate both the relevance of the story to
the multilateral initiatives to liberalize NTBs, and the scope for coordina-
tion between regional and multilateral NTB liberalization policies. Speciﬁ-
cally, early coordination could be useful to prevent potential conﬂicts among
highly-idiosyncratic institutions of deeper integration.
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